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We present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that does not rely on utility costs of default
or on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings. The theory is
based on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive to signal
his type to entities other than creditors. Speci¯cally, debtors signal their low-risk status to
insurers by avoiding default in credit markets. The signal is credible because in equilibrium
people who repay are more likely to be the low-risk type and so receive better insurance
terms. We explore two di®erent mechanisms through which repayment behavior in the
credit market can be positively correlated with low-risk status in the insurance market. Our
theory is motivated in part by some facts regarding the role of credit scores in consumer
credit and auto insurance markets.
Key Words: Unsecured Consumer Debt, Bankruptcy, Default, Adverse Selection, Credit
Score, Insurance
JEL: D82 D91 G191 Introduction
The question we address in this paper is: how can unsecured consumer debt coexist with
debtor's right to invoke bankruptcy? We propose a theory of unsecured consumer debt that
is based on the existence of private information about a person's type and on the fact that
some debtors have the incentive to forgo bankruptcy in order to signal their type. The theory
formalizes the notion that a person's type may be relevant to di®erent trading partners and if
a person has some advantage in resisting opportunistic behavior against one trading partner,
he may credibly signal information about his type to other trading partners by doing so.
Our theory of unsecured consumer debt is distinct from some other approaches to explaining
debt when enforcement is imperfect. Our model has ¯nite-lived people to whom the opportu-
nity to borrow and repay is presented only once. So our theory does not rely on enforcement
mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings. Also, our theory does not depend on
any utility cost of failing to honor debt contracts { there is no stigma attached to default.
There are three periods and two markets in the model. There is an asset market that
links periods 1 and 2, and a period 3 insurance market that provides insurance against an
observable loss. People in our model di®er with respect to the likelihood of this loss { some
are more likely to su®er the loss than others. But insurers do not directly observe the risk
status of people, and so the low-risk types have an incentive to signal their type. This
signalling can take two forms: accepting limited insurance in the insurance market for a
lower premium and resisting opportunistic behavior in the credit market, i.e., not invoking
the right to default in the credit market. Crucially, repayment of debt is a credible signal of
low-risk status because low-risk people have an advantage in resisting opportunistic behavior
in the credit market, and therefore, in equilibrium those who repay are more likely to be the
low-risk type.
We explore two distinct reasons why low-risk people may have an advantage in resisting
opportunistic behavior in credit markets. In the ¯rst case, we assume that people who are
1low-risk are also more patient. Then repayment is a credible signal of low-risk status because
the bene¯t of a lower insurance premium comes in the future { in period 3 { and the low-risk
type is also the type who values the future more. Put di®erently, the high-risk type does not
mimic the low-risk type and does not send the same signal (i.e., repay their debt) because
they do not care enough about the future and so do not value the bene¯t of a lower insurance
premium to the same extent.
In the second case, we assume that there is a di®erence in the stochastic environment facing
the low-risk and high-risk types. In particular, we assume that the high-risk type is more
likely to experience shocks that trigger default. Consequently, repayment of debt can act as
a signal of low-risk status because the kinds of shocks that lead to default are less likely to
be experienced by the low-risk types.
The two explanations can be di®erentiated as follows. In the ¯rst case repayment is a signal
of low-risk status because the low-risk type is more willing to repay; in the second case
repayment is a signal of low-risk status because the low-risk type is less likely to be in
situations that trigger default. The ¯rst explanation relies on di®erences in behavior, while
the second explanation relies on di®erences in luck.
Our theory of unsecured consumer debt is motivated by some features of the U.S. economy.
Most important, reputation appears to play an important role in credit and insurance mar-
kets. In particular, both industries make use of credit scores { a summary measure of a
person's creditworthiness (the likelihood that a person will repay his or her debt). In the
credit market the following facts are well established: (i) people with higher scores obtain
credit on cheaper terms, (ii) default lowers a person's credit score, and (iii) holding ¯xed a
person's credit limit, more borrowing tends to lower a person's credit score.1 In the insur-
ance market (iv) people with higher scores tend to receive insurance at a lower price.2 In
1On these points see http://www.myfico.com/Downloads/Files/myFICO CFA
2Consumers with low credit scores pay 20 to 50 percent more in auto insurance premiums than consumers
with high credit scores. And two-thirds of policy holders have lower premiums because of their high credit
scores. On this point, see http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/insurance/credit-scores1.asp
2turn people with high credit scores default less frequently and ¯le fewer insurance claims.
The key contribution of this paper is to present a theory of unsecured consumer debt in
which something like a credit score emerges endogenously and which is consistent with facts
(i)-(iv).
In the theory presented in this paper, the insurance bene¯t of a good credit-market reputation
is the sole reason people repay their debt. In other words, no credit is extended to any person
if all types are equally risky with respect to the insurable loss, since there is no reward to
curtailing opportunistic behavior in the credit market. Clearly, this is a simpli¯cation {
people may wish to maintain a good reputation in the credit market in order to maintain
access to credit on cheap terms in the future. In a companion paper (Chatterjee et al. [4])
we study an in¯nite horizon environment where this particular bene¯t of good credit market
behavior is analyzed.
The theory of debt presented in this paper is a reputation-based theory that employs an
\adverse selection approach" wherein creditors attempt to learn about the borrower's type.3
In this it bears a resemblance to the reputation-based model of sovereign debt presented in
Cole and Kehoe [5]. However, both the motivation and details in Cole and Kehoe are di®erent
from ours. Cole and Kehoe's important insight was a response to Bulow and Rogo®'s [2]
criticism of models of sovereign debt based on exclusion costs of default. Bulow and Rogo®
showed that if a country can default and simultaneously purchase consumption insurance out
of its resulting savings, exclusion costs of default have no bite and equilibria with positive
debt will fail to exist.4 Cole and Kehoe wrote down a model where there are two types of
sovereigns and one type su®ers a large disutility of reneging on a debt contract { a disutility
3An alternative repeated-interaction approach assumes there is no hidden information about types but
agents resist opportunistic behavior in order to avoid a less favorable continuation path in the game. In this
approach, the punishment-triggering deviation is sometimes interpreted as \loss of one's reputation." See
Chapter 15 of Mailath and Samuelson [9] for a discussion of the two approaches and for arguments in favor
of modeling reputation using the adverse selection approach.
4Earlier work, such as the seminal study of Eaton and Gersovitz [6], had justi¯ed the assumption of
exclusion from international borrowing and lending following default as resulting from a loss in \reputation"
of the sovereign and Bulow and Rogo®'s demonstration was, therefore, viewed as a criticism of reputation-
based models of sovereign debt.
3thought to come from default tarnishing the government's reputation in another market (e.g.,
the labor market). Even if type is not directly observable to lenders, the utility cost of a bad
reputation can support positive amounts of (unsecured) debt if sovereigns are su±ciently
patient.
The ¯rst point to note is that Bulow and Rogo®'s criticism of exclusion-based models of
sovereign debt are not germane to correctly speci¯ed exclusion-based models of unsecured
consumer debt. U.S. bankruptcy law does not permit those invoking bankruptcy to simulta-
neously accumulate assets: a bankrupt must relinquish all (non-exempt) assets to creditors
at the time that discharge of debt is granted by a bankruptcy court.5 However, there is no
restriction on accumulating assets after discharge has been granted. Thus the exclusion costs
of U.S. consumer bankruptcy are the costs of not being able to save in the period of default
and not being able to borrow for some time following default (these are the exclusion costs
of default in Chatterjee et al. [3]). The fact that saving is not permitted in the period of
default means that positive amounts of unsecured debt can be supported in equilibrium, so
existence is not an issue. However, the fact that defaulters can save in the periods following
default implies that the costs of default tend to be too low, which makes it challenging to
match certain moments of the debt and default data in a plausibly calibrated model like that
of Chatterjee et al. [3]. Part of our motivation in considering a model of debt with reputation
e®ects is to explore costs of default that go beyond those of credit market exclusion.
A second di®erence between our paper and Cole and Kehoe's is that we are explicit about
how default can lead to a cost in a market other than the credit market. As mentioned above,
Cole and Kehoe assume that there is a utility cost to default, but they do not derive this
utility cost from fundamentals. We do. Being explicit about the cost is important because
alternative signalling devices may be used in this other market to circumvent the problem of
hidden information about type. For instance, if insurers can ¯gure out who they are dealing
5Some U.S. states (Texas and Florida) exempt home equity from bankruptcy proceedings. However, even
in those states, diversion of assets into home equity during bankruptcy proceedings would be considered an
abuse of the bankruptcy provision and would not be permitted.
4with by using appropriately designed contracts, they need not care about their client's credit
market behavior.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we lay out the environment. In section
3 we go through the decision problem of each agent. In section 4 we give the de¯nition
of a competitive equilibrium and prove some basic properties. In section 5 we analyze the
equilibrium of the period 3 insurance market and explain how the insurance contracts depend
on the credit score. At the start of section 6 we point out that di®erences in loss probability
across types and private information about types are essential for debt to be valued in our
environment. Then, in section 6.1 we specialize the model to one where there are only 2 asset
levels that people can choose from in period 1 and analyze the credit market equilibrium
for the case where low- and high-risk types di®er with respect to their discount factors.
In section 6.2 we permit any ¯nite number of asset level choices in period 1 and analyze
the credit market equilibrium for the case where people di®er in terms of the probability
distributions from which idiosyncratic shocks are drawn. The key result here is that there
exist distributions from which these shocks are drawn such that an equilibrium with positive
debt characterized by properties (i)-(iv) exists. Section 7 concludes.
2 Environment
There is a single good. There are 3 periods, denoted t = 1;2; and 3 and a unit measure of
people. We will describe people who live in this economy, the legal environment they face,
the market arrangement, and the timing of events.
2.1 People
There are two types of people, denoted i 2 fb;gg. The measure of type g is 0 < ° < 1 and
the measure of type b is (1 ¡ °).
5The endowment of each person is given by e > 0 and is constant over time. In period 3 a
person of type i faces a probability ¼i > 0 of experiencing a loss in wealth L, where L is a
given number in (0;e). For each type, the loss is an independent draw from the corresponding
loss distribution. The loss incurred by a person is denoted by z 2 f0;Lg.









where ct is consumption of the single good in period t and µt 2 R+ is a period-t pref-
erence shock drawn independently for each person of type i from the probability space
fR+;B(R+);F i
tg. The utility function u(c) : R+ ! R is strictly concave and twice continu-
ously di®erentiable.
A person's type and preference shocks are not directly observable to others. The loss in
period 3, however, is observable to others.
Types di®er by the probability of the observable loss, by discount factors, and by the prob-
ability distribution of preference shocks. Throughout this study we assume that the proba-
bility of the observable loss is lower for type g than for type b, i.e., 0 < ¼g < ¼b < 1. Since
the type of a person is not directly observable to others, type g people have an incentive to
signal their type to insurers. We are interested in situations where type g people attempt
to signal their type to insurers by resisting opportunistic behavior in the credit market. For
this signalling to be credible, the cost of any signal must be lower for type g than for type b
(otherwise the type b people will always mimic the type g).
We explore two distinct ways in which the cost of signalling could be lower for type g than
for type b. The ¯rst mechanism relies on di®erences in discount factors. In particular, type g
people are assumed to be more patient than type b people, i.e., ¯b < ¯g. The second mecha-
nism relies on di®erences in the distribution of preference shocks across types. In particular,
the required di®erences are consistent with F b
2(µ2) ¯rst-order stochastic dominating F
g
2(µ2),
6i.e., with F b
2(µ2) · F
g
2(µ2) for all µ2 ¸ 0 (inequality holding strictly for some µ2).
2.2 Legal Environment
A key feature of the environment is the existence of a bankruptcy law. This law gives people
the right to disavow their ¯nancial obligations. As is generally true for actual bankruptcy
law, this \right to bankruptcy" is assumed to be inalienable { meaning that a debtor cannot
waive his or her right to bankruptcy at the time of taking out a loan. For simplicity, we
assume that invoking the right to bankruptcy does not cost the debtor any fees or expenses.
2.3 Market Arrangements
There are two sets of markets. In one market people borrow from or lend to banks, and in
the other market, people purchase insurance against the observable loss L. Since household
type is private information, and type will matter for the propensity of a person to declare
bankruptcy or su®er a loss, banks and insurance companies must make an assessment of a
person's type when selling a loan or an insurance policy.6 We will study a market structure
that permits the terms of ¯nancial contracts to depend on such an assessment. In what
follows, we will use ¾ as the generic symbol to denote the probability that a person is type
g. Then ¾ is the assessment of a person's type or, more succinctly, a person's type score. A
person's type score will evolve over time because a person's actions in the asset and insurance
markets can (and will) reveal information about a person's true type. We imagine that there
is an information processing agency (resembling real-world credit bureaus) that keeps track
of a person's actions in the asset and insurance markets { i.e., keeps track of a person's
¯nancial history.
6If the preference shocks are correlated over time, banks may also have an incentive to form an assessment
of the preference shock hitting a person because this information will be valuable in predicting future default.
Since we have assumed that shocks are i.i.d, this assessment is not necessary.
7The asset market operates only in period 1.7 The asset market o®ers one-period bond
contracts y 2 A, where A is a ¯nite subset of R. These bond contracts are o®ered at prices
q(y;¾). A person with type score ¾ who purchases the contract y pays q(y;¾)¢y in period 1
and receives y in period 2. A positive y signi¯es a deposit and a negative y signi¯es a loan.
If y < 0, the person promises to repay y in period 2 conditional on not declaring bankruptcy.
Finally, we assume that banks have access to a world credit market in which they borrow or
save at the interest rate r.8
The insurance market in period 3 operates as follows. Insurers o®er contracts x in I, where
I is a compact subset of R. A person with type score ¾ who purchases the contract x pays
p(x;¾) ¢ x as a premium and, in the event of loss, collects the indemnity x. This notation
emphasizes the symmetry between the loan and insurance markets. Just as the probability
of default on a loan will depend on the size of the loan, so too can the probability of loss on
an insurance contract depend on the amount of insurance purchased { for the usual moral
hazard reasons. However, in this paper we abstract from moral hazard issues { for each type
of person, the probability of loss cannot be a®ected by any action that the person can take.
Therefore, in equilibrium, the price of insurance will turn out to depend only on ¾ and not
on x.
A ¯nancial ¯rm takes the set of contracts and prices fq(y;¾);y 2 Ag and fp(x;¾);x 2 Ig
as given. Any given contract is viewed as a distinct ¯nancial product. There is free-entry
in the provision of each of these ¯nancial products. In equilibrium each of these ¯nancial
products will fetch zero pro¯ts in expectation.
An important feature of the environment is the possibility that a person's actions in the
asset and insurance markets may reveal information about a person's type. The possibility
7There is obviously no role for an asset market in period 3, since no one lives beyond period 3. In
period 2 it is impossible to support borrowing if agents can default after their insurance choices. Hence the
assumption that there is no loan market in period 2 is without loss of generality. For simplicity we also rule
out savings in period 2.
8Alternatively, we could imagine that banks have access to a storage technology that allows them to
transform 1 unit of output in period 1 into (1+r) units of output in period 2. This would require incorporating
the restriction that aggregate consumer assets cannot be negative.
8of information transmission is captured by the following three belief-updating functions.
² The function s = ª1(`) gives the person's type score at the end of period 1 if the
person chooses asset level `.
² The function s0 = ª2(d;`;ª1(`)) gives a person's type score at the end of period 2 if
he starts period 2 with asset `, type score ª1(`), and chooses a bankruptcy decision d
(d = 1 means ¯le for bankruptcy and d = 0 means no ¯ling).
² The function s00 = ª3(x;ª2(d;`;ª1(`))) gives a person's type score if he starts period
3 with type score ª2(d;`;ª1(`)) and chooses an insurance level x.
All market participants take these functions and the sets A and I as given. Therefore, the
prices faced by participants in the loan and insurance markets are q(`;ª1(`));` 2 A and
p(x;ª3(x;ª2(d;`;ª1(`)));x 2 I.
2.4 The Timing of Events
The timing of events in each period is as follows.
People begin period 1 with type score ° and learn their true type i and the realization of the
preference shock µ1. They then choose how much to borrow or save from the set A. This
choice is used to update a person's type score from ° to s. Then they consume and period
1 ends.
People begin period 2 with their type score s and learn the realization of their preference
shock µ2. If a person borrowed in period 1, the person then chooses whether or not to default.
This choice is used to update a person's type score from s to s0. After the default decision
is made they consume and period 2 comes to an end.
People begin the period with type score s0 and purchase insurance from the set I. Their
9choice of insurance is used to update the type score to s00. Then the shock z is realized and
the person receives the insurance payment if z = L. Then people consume and die.9
3 Decision Problems
In this section we describe the decision problem of people, insurers, and banks.
3.1 People
It's convenient to start with the ¯nal period and work backward.
3.1.1 Period 3
At the start of period 3 each person will have a type score s0 that is determined by the
person's choices in the asset market via the function s0 = ª2(d;`;ª1(`)). Then, a type i
person's insurance decision problem is as follows.
V
i
3(ª2(d;`;ª1(`))) = max x ¼
iu(e ¡ p(x;s







Observe that the set of insurance choices available to a person may be constrained by a
person's beginning-of-period 3 type score ª2(d;`;ª1(`)). These constraints will be elaborated
upon in the next section. We will denote a type i person's decision rule regarding insurance
9An alternative model where periods 2 and 3 are lumped together and the timing is a default decision
followed by an insurance choice cannot support the type of equilibrium we describe in section 6.1 of the
paper because di®erences in discount factors cannot then play the role they do.
10purchase as xi(ª2(d;`;ª1(`))).
3.1.2 Period 2
People begin period 2 with some asset holding ` and a corresponding type score ª1(`). At
the start of the period they learn their preference shock µ2. If a person of type i is a debtor
and chooses to default, i.e., d = 1, the person's utility is given by
V
i; d=1




















If both options fetch the same utility, we assume that the person chooses d = 0.
If the person is not a debtor, then he has no choice to make { the person simply consumes
e + `. However, it will be be convenient to assume that in this case his \choice" of d is also
0. With this convention, the choice of d is de¯ned for all `. We will denote a type i's period
2 decision rules as di(µ2;`;ª1(`)).
113.1.3 Period 1
At the start of period 1 people learn their type i and their preference shock µ1. The decision
problem of a person of type i is then
V
i








e ¡ q(`;ª1(`)) ¢ ` ¸ 0 and ` 2 A
We will denote a type i's period 1 decision rule as `i(µ1).
3.2 Insurers
Insurers face a set of insurance contracts x 2 I and prices fp(x;ª2(d;`;ª1(`)))g. The
decision problem of insurers is to choose how many of these di®erent types of contracts to
sell. Clearly insurers will participate in selling any contract x 2 I that makes non-negative










In period 1, banks face a set of loan contracts y 2 A and prices fq(y;ª1(y));y 2 Ag. As in
the case of insurers, the decision problem of banks is to choose how many of these di®erent
12types of contracts to sell. And, as in the case of insurers, banks will participate in selling
only those contracts that make non-negative pro¯ts in expectation.
For y < 0, non-negative pro¯ts require











where r is the risk-free rate available to banks and ¹i(y) is the probability that a person of











For y > 0, non-negative pro¯ts require that
q(y;ª1(y)) ¸ (1 + r)
¡1:
4 Equilibrium
We can now state the de¯nition of a competitive equilibrium.







1(`)), (ii) a set of loan prices q¤(`;ª¤




1(`))); (iv) a set of default probabilities ¹i¤(`); (iv) a




1. Each loan earns zero pro¯ts.

















































1(`))dF2(µ2) for ` < 0: (6)
4. The decision rules `i¤(µ1), di¤(µ2;`;ª¤
1(`)) and x¤i(ª¤
2(d;`;ª¤
1(`))) solve each household
type's optimization problem given (i) the loan pricing function q¤(`;ª¤
1(`))), ` 2 A,
(ii) the insurance pricing function p¤(x;ª¤
3(x;ª¤
2(d;`;ª¤








5. Updating functions are consistent with decision rules and satisfy Bayes' Rule whenever
possible. To state these conditions, de¯ne Hi¤
1 (`) = fµ1 : `i¤(µ1) = `g and Hi¤
2 (d;`) =
fµ2 : di¤(µ2;`;ª¤




















provided the denominator is positive { that is, provided a positive measure of






















































provided, again, the denominator is positive.
We can now state a basic result, namely, that if there exists an equilibrium in which borrowing
is not permitted, then there always exists a competitive equilibrium in which borrowing is
permitted but no borrowing actually occurs in equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, insurers
ignore a person's behavior in the credit market and therefore all borrowers have an incentive
to default. In that case default behavior is, in fact, uninformative about a borrower's type
and no borrowing can be supported.
Proposition 1: Let B ½ R be a ¯nite set with positive and negative elements. Suppose
there exists a competitive equilibrium for an economy for which A = B \ R+ (i.e., no bor-
rowing is permitted). Then there always exists another competitive equilibrium in which
A = B but q¤(`;s) = 0 for all ` < 0 (i.e., no loans are made).
Proof We will establish the Proposition by extending the \no-borrowing" equilibrium
belief-updating function ª¤
1(`) to negative values of ` and the \no-borrowing" equilibrium
belief-updating function ª¤
2(d;`;ª¤
1(`)) to allow for debt and default in such a way as to
leave budget sets and signalling opportunities unchanged. In this new extended equilibrium
q¤(`;s) will be 0 for all ` < 0.
15For any given ª¤









1(`))) = V i
3(ª¤
2(1;`;ª¤
1(`))) = V i
3(ª¤
1(`)) and so di(µ2;`;ª¤
1(`)) = 1 is optimal
for all µ2 ¸ 0 and ` < 0. Given this decision rule it follows from (6) that for ` < 0,
¹i(`) = 1, from (4) that q¤(`;ª¤




the Bayesian updating conditions. Since for ª¤
2(0;`;ª¤
1(`)) the Bayesian updating formula






1(0) for all ` < 0 so that any consumption stream a person can get
by choosing ` < 0 in period 1 and defaulting in period 2 can be obtained by choosing
` = 0. Given this it follows that `¤(µ1) ¸ 0 { the optimal period-1 decision rule for the \no-
borrowing" equilibrium { continues to be the optimal period-1 decision rule for the economy
in which borrowing is permitted but all prices on loans are zero. Since no one chooses





In the rest of the paper, we explore the possibility of equilibria in which behavior in the
credit market conveys useful information to insurers. It is a useful fact that the equilibrium
of this model can be analyzed in three blocks { corresponding to the three periods. In period
3, the equilibrium decision rule x¤i(ª¤
2(d;`;ª¤










satisfy zero pro¯ts and ª¤
3(x;ª¤
2(d;`;ª¤
1(`))) must satisfy Bayes' Law whenever possible. In
period 2, di¤(µ2;`;ª¤
1(`)) must be the optimal decision rule given the period-3 equilibrium
value function and the belief-updating function ª¤
2(d;`;ª¤
1(`)) and, in turn, ª¤
2(d;`;ª¤
1(`))
must satisfy Bayes' Law whenever possible. Finally, in period 1, the equilibrium decision
rule `i¤(µ1) must be the optimal decision rule given the period-2 equilibrium value function,
q¤(`;ª¤
1(`)) and the belief-updating function ª¤
1(`) and, in turn, q¤(`;ª¤
1(`)) must satisfy
16zero pro¯ts and ª¤
1(`) satis¯es Bayes' Law whenever possible.
Since type g people are better insurance risks than type b people, the equilibria of interest
are those in which people resist opportunistic behavior in the credit market in an e®ort to
signal that they are more likely to be type g. For this logic to work, it must be true that
people with a high score are treated better in the insurance market. But insurers may o®er
contracts that separate people into good and bad insurance risks, so it's not obvious that
a person's type score will matter in the insurance market. Therefore, the nature of the
equilibrium in the period-3 insurance market is key and it is to this issue we now turn.
5 Equilibrium in the Insurance Market: Pooling, Sep-
aration and Type Score
The microeconomic literature on the provision of insurance indicates that for a population
with two hidden types, competition among insurers could result in one of two kinds of equi-
librium - pooling or separating. In a pooling equilibrium insurers o®er one full-insurance
contract at a price that re°ects the composition of low- and high-risk types in the popu-
lation. In a separating equilibrium insurers o®er two contracts, one with a low price but
enough limitations on insurance so as to attract only the low-risk types and another with
full insurance at a high price for the remaining high-risk types.
An important insight of the microeconomic insurance literature is that competitive insurers
have an incentive to break away from pooling contracts. In a pooling contract where insurers
make zero pro¯ts, the low-risk types must subsidize the high-risk types, since both types
pay the same price but the high-risk types have a higher probability of loss. Because of
this subsidy, insurers have an incentive to entice away the low-risk types by o®ering them
slightly less-than-full-insurance at a price that is signi¯cantly below the pooling contract
price but above the price that would be actuarially fair for low-risk types (a so-called \cream
17skimming" strategy). Given this incentive toward \cream skimming," Rothschild and Stiglitz
[12] claimed that pooling contracts cannot exist in equilibrium. But Wilson [13] (see also
Miyazaki [11]) pointed out that if ¯rms anticipate that contracts rendered unpro¯table by
cream-skimming will be withdrawn from the market, they will also anticipate that the cream-
skimming contract will end up attracting both high- and low-risk types and therefore turn
out to be unpro¯table. Given these anticipations, Wilson showed that ¯rms cannot o®er
separating contracts on which they anticipate earning non-negative pro¯ts and so equilibrium
with pooling contracts can exist.10
We will proceed in the spirit of Wilson's notion of equilibrium in the insurance market.
In particular, we will assume that people are o®ered the full insurance pooling contract
unless there exists a separating contract that the low-risk types will strictly prefer over the
pooling contract and that the high-risk types will not strictly prefer over an actuarially fair
full insurance contract. This latter requirement takes Wilson's point into account, namely,
that if a limited insurance contract is successful in attracting only the low-risk types then
the insurance alternatives facing the high-risk types no longer include the original pooling
contract. Therefore, for the limited insurance separating contract to be feasible, we require
that the high-risk types prefer obtaining full insurance at a high but actuarially fair price
over obtaining limited insurance at a lower price that is actuarially fair for the low-risk types.
In what follows, we will establish that there is a threshold value for the type score, ¾¤, such
that separating contracts are not feasible for pools with type score equal to or greater than ¾¤
but are feasible for pools with type score less than ¾¤. Furthermore, if a separating contract
is feasible then there is a unique best separating contract that can be o®ered to the low-risk
types regardless of their type score. These results are used to de¯ne the insurance choice
10A similar point was made by Hellwig [8], who analyzed a 3-period extensive form game in which in the
¯rst stage ¯rms o®er insurance contracts, in the second stage customers apply for insurance under one of
these contracts and, in the third stage, ¯rms accept or reject customers' applications for insurance. Hellwig
argued that the possibility that a ¯rm may reject customers' applications in the third stage implies that
customers cannot rationally believe that an application for a low-priced limited insurance contract will be
accepted by the o®ering ¯rm in the ¯nal stage. Given this belief, no customer applies for insurance under
a low-priced limited insurance contract and the pooling contract survives. Also, see Elul [7] for a recent
application of the Wilson-Miyazaki concept of equilibrium in a related context.
18correspondence I(s0) used later in the paper.
First, some terminology and de¯nitions. Denote an insurance contract as a pair (X;m),
where X is the indemnity and m is the price per unit of insurance (so that the premium on
the contract is m ¢ X). Denote the utility of a type i household from purchasing a contract
(X;m) by W i(X;m) = ¼iu(e ¡ mX ¡ L + X) + (1 ¡ ¼i)u(e ¡ mX). Denote the price of
an actuarially fair, or zero pro¯t, insurance contract o®ered to people with type score ¾ by
m(¾) = ¾¼g + (1 ¡ ¾)¼b. Then we have the following de¯nition of a feasible full insurance
pooling contract.
De¯nition: The full insurance pooling contract (L;m(¾)) is feasible if there does not exist
a contract (X;¼g), X < L, such that (i) W g(X;¼g) > W(L;m(¾)) and (ii) W b(L;¼b) ¸
W b(X;¼g).
This de¯nition of feasibility captures the idea behind Wilson's notion of equilibrium in the
insurance market. Basically, for a pooling contract for people with type score ¾ to be
infeasible there must exist a limited insurance actuarially fair contract that type g people
strictly prefer over the pooling contract and which is not strictly preferred by the type b
people over an actuarially fair full insurance contract.
We make the following assumption on the utility function.
Assumption 1: u(e ¡ ¼bL) > ¼gu(e ¡ L) + (1 ¡ ¼g)u(e).
The inequality e®ectively asserts that a type g person prefers to purchase full insurance at a
price that is appropriate for the type b households to not purchase insurance at all. Clearly
this assumption is a restriction on curvature of the u function and the loss L { the function
must be su±ciently concave or the loss su±ciently large.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique X¤ 2 (0;L) such that W b(X¤;¼g)= W b(L;¼b).
Proof Since ¼g < ¼b it's clear that W b(X = L;¼g) > W b(L;¼b). And, by virtue of
the strict concavity of u, no-insurance is worse than full-insurance at an actuarially fair
19price so W b(X = 0;¼g) < W b(L;¼b). Clearly W b(X;¼g) is a continuous function of X 2
[0;L]. Therefore, the existence of X¤ 2 (0;L) follows from the Intermediate Value Theorem.
Uniqueness of X¤ follows from the fact that W b(X;¼g) is strictly increasing in X, since
insurance is being o®ered at a price that is lower than the probability of loss.
¤
Since W b(X;¼g) is strictly increasing in X, X¤ has the interpretation of being the most
generous actuarially fair (or, zero-pro¯ts) insurance that can be o®ered to type g people
who are in a pool with type score ¾ 2 [0;1] without necessarily attracting the type b people
in the pool.
Lemma 2 There exists a unique x(¾) 2 [0;L] such that [W g(x(¾);¼g)¡W g(L;m(¾))] = 0.
Furthermore, x(¾) is continuous and strictly increasing in ¾.
Proof First, observe that W g(X;¼g) is clearly continuous in X and, because the price of
the insurance is actuarially fair, it is strictly increasing in X. Consider ¯rst the case where
¾ = 1. Clearly a unique x(1) exists and is equal to L. Next consider any ¾ 2 [0;1).
Then W g(X = L;¼g) > W g(L;m(¾)) because ¼g < m(¾). Furthermore, W g(X = 0;¼g) <
W g(L;m(¾) because by Assumption 1 W g(X = 0;¼g) < W g(L;¼b) and because m(¾) is
increasing in ¾ and W g(L;m) is increasing in m. Therefore, by the continuity of W g(X;¼g)
and the Intermediate Value Theorem, x(¾) 2 (0;L) exists. And by the strict monotonicity of
W g(X;¼g) in X, x(¾) 2 (0;L) is unique. From the continuity of W g(X;¼g) with respect to
X, the continuity of m(¾) with respect to ¾, and the continuity of W g(L;m) with respect to
m, it follows that x(¾) is a continuous function of ¾ 2 [0;1]. Furthermore, since W g(L;m(¾))
is strictly increasing in ¾ and W g(X;¼g) is strictly increasing in X, it follows that x(¾) is
strictly increasing in ¾.
¤
Since W g(X;¼g) is strictly increasing in X, x(¾) has the interpretation of being the least
20generous actuarially fair insurance that can be o®ered to type g people in a pool with type
score ¾ that weakly dominates a full-insurance contract o®ered at the price m(¾).
Corollary to Lemmas 1 and 2: A full-insurance pooling contract (L;m(¾)) o®ered to
people with type score ¾ is not feasible if x(¾) < X¤ and is feasible if x(¾) ¸ X¤.
Proof: Suppose x(¾) < X¤. Consider a contract ( ~ X;¼g), where X¤ > ~ X > x(¾). Type
g people will strictly prefer such a contract to the pooling contract, but type b people will
not prefer such a contract over the contract (L;¼b). Therefore the contract (L;m(¾)) is not
feasible. Suppose x(¾) ¸ X¤. Suppose, to get a contradiction, that the pooling contract
(L;m(¾)) is not feasible. Then there must exist a contract (X;¼g) that is strictly better than
(L;m(¾)) for type g people and that the type b people do not strictly prefer over (L;¼b).
The ¯rst implies that X > x(¾) and the second implies that X · X¤. Together they imply
that x(¾) < X¤, which contradicts the assertion that x(¾) ¸ X¤.
¤
Proposition 2: (i) There exists a cut-o® type score ¾¤ 2 (0;1) below which a full-insurance
pooling contract is not feasible and at or above which it is feasible. (ii) Furthermore when
a pooling contract is not feasible the best separating contract that can be o®ered to type g
is the contract (X¤;¼g).
Proof (i) Given the fact that x(¾) is strictly increasing in ¾ (Lemma 2) and the corollary
to Lemmas 1 and 2, it is su±cient to establish that there is a unique ¾¤ 2 (0;1) that satis¯es
the equation x(¾¤) = X¤. From Lemmas 1 and 2 we know x(¾ = 1) = L > X¤. Now
consider x(0), which solves
¼
gu(e ¡ ¼
gx(0) ¡ L + x(0)) + (1 ¡ ¼
g)u(e ¡ ¼
gx(0)) = u(e ¡ ¼
bL): (10)
We know that X¤ solves
¼
bu(e ¡ ¼
gX ¡ L + X) + (1 ¡ ¼
b)u(e ¡ ¼
gX) = u(e ¡ ¼
bL): (11)
21Since X¤ < L (by Lemma 1), we know that u(e¡¼bL) < u(e¡¼gX)). Therefore, u(e¡¼bL)
being the average of the two terms in (11), it follows that
u(e ¡ ¼
gX
¤ ¡ L + X
¤) < u(e ¡ ¼
bL) < u(e ¡ ¼
gX
¤):




¤ ¡ L + X
¤) + (1 ¡ ¼
g)u(e ¡ ¼
gX
¤) > u(e ¡ ¼
bL): (12)
Hence (10) and (12) imply x(0) < X¤. By Lemma 2, x(¾) is continuous and strictly increasing
in ¾. Therefore there must exist a unique ¾¤ 2 (0;1) such that x(¾¤) = X¤.
(ii) When ¾ < ¾¤ then the least generous limited-insurance contract that a type g would
take over a full-insurance contract at price m(¾) is less than X¤. Therefore, any contract
( e X;¼g), e X 2 (x(¾);X¤] will induce type g to migrate to the limited-insurance contract
without giving type b a strict incentive to choose the limited-insurance contract over a full-
insurance contract o®ered at the price ¼b. However, among the set of separating contracts,
the contract (X¤;¼g) gives the highest utility to type g because u is strictly concave and the
insurance is o®ered at a price that is actuarially fair for type g people.
¤
The reason there is a cut-o® value of ¾¤ at or above which a pooling contract is feasible is
that we require that when a separating contract is o®ered to the low-risk types, the high-
risk types must not ¯nd it in their interest to re-pool with the low-risk types (and accept
limited insurance) over a contract that o®ers them full insurance at a high but actuarially
fair (i.e., non-subsidized) price. Importantly, the incentive of high-risk types to \re-pool"
varies inversely with the proportion of high-risk types in the pool. When the pool contains
relatively few high-risk types, the price of insurance in the limited-insurance contract cannot
be too much below the price of insurance in the original pooling contract, and therefore,
22the insurance o®ered at the lower price cannot be too much below full insurance. Such a
contract will appear quite attractive to a high-risk type whose alternative is to purchase
somewhat more insurance at a potentially much higher price. Therefore, a pooling contract
cannot be broken by a separating contract when the fraction of high-risk types in the pool
is su±ciently low.
To summarize, Proposition 2 establishes that the kind of insurance opportunities a person
will face depends on the person's type score s0 { speci¯cally, people with relatively high s0 will
be o®ered full insurance pooling contracts while people with relatively low s0 will be o®ered
separating contracts. This result is incorporated into our environment via the insurance






f0;X¤;Lg if s0 < ¾¤
f0;Lg if s0 ¸ ¾¤
(13)
With this de¯nition of I(s0), we can characterize the period-3 insurance market equilibrium.11
Proposition 3: Given the insurance contract correspondence (13), the following functions
constitute a period-3 insurance market equilibrium: (i) p¤(x;ª¤
3(x;s0)) = ¼b ¡ª¤
3(x;s0)(¼b ¡






> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
s0 if s0 ¸ ¾¤ and x 2 f0;Lg
1 if s0 < ¾¤ and x = X¤
s0 if s0 < ¾¤ and x = 0
0 if s0 < ¾¤ and x = L
Proof Obviously, p¤(x;ª¤
3(x;s0)) satis¯es the zero pro¯t condition (5) in the de¯nition of
11In the interest of keeping the analysis simple, we do not explore the robustness of the credit market
equilibrium to sets of insurance contracts other than the one that provides the best possible separating
contract to the low-risk type. Furthermore, we do not consider the possible bene¯ts of long-term contracts
that can presumably be o®ered by a banking-insurance conglomerate.
23equilibrium. So we need only establish that x¤i(s0) are optimal and ª¤
3(x;s0) satisfy condition
(9) in the de¯nition of competitive equilibrium. Observe that a type-i person's insurance

















x 2 f0;Lg if s
0 ¸ ¾







Consider ¯rst households with s0 ¸ ¾¤. For these households ª¤
3(x;s0) = s0 for x 2 f0;Lg.
By Assumption 1 it follows that the optimal insurance choice for these households, regardless
of type, is x = L. Consider next a household with s0 < ¾¤. If this household chooses x = X¤
then ª¤
3 implies that the household's s00 = 1. By the pricing function p¤, the household will
face the price ¼g. Now suppose the household is of type g. Since the price ¼g is actuarially
fair for him, conditional on choosing x · X¤, it is optimal for him to choose x = X¤ by
Assumption 1. If the household is of type b, then the price ¼g is better than actuarially fair.
So, conditional on choosing x · X, it also optimal for a type b household to choose x = X¤
by concavity of u(:). On the other hand, for any household that chooses x = L; ª¤
3 implies
that the household's s00 = 0. By the pricing function p¤, it follows that the household will
face the price ¼b. Consequently, the choice of insurance reduces to a choice between the
contract (X¤;¼g) and the contract (L;¼b) regardless of type. Now we know from Lemma
1 that a type b person is indi®erent between these two contracts. And by Lemma 2 we
know that a type g household with s0 < ¾¤ strictly prefers the contract (X¤;¼g) to (L;¼b).
Therefore xi¤(s0) is the optimal decision rule.
We now verify that ª¤
3(x;s0) satis¯es Bayes' Rule whenever possible. Consider ¯rst s0 ¸ ¾¤
in which case I(s0) = f0;Lg. The decision rules imply that both types choose x = L.
24Therefore,
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(s0)=Lg = s
0 and s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(s0)=Lg + (1 ¡ s
0) ¢ 1fxb¤(s0)=Lg = 1:
These expressions imply that for s0 ¸ ¾¤, ª¤
3(x = L;s0) satis¯es the requirements in (9).
For x = 0, however, the requirements lead to an indeterminacy (0/0). In this case, we
assume that the o®-equilibrium choice is uninformative about a person's type. That is
ª¤
3(x = 0;s0) = s0.
Next, consider s0 < ¾¤ in which case I(s0) = f0;X¤;Lg. The decision rules imply that type
g people choose x = X¤ and type b choose x = L. Therefore,
s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(s0)=Lg = 0 and s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(s0)=Lg + (1 ¡ s




0 ¢ 1fxg¤(s0)=X¤g = s
0 and s
0 ¢ 1fxg¤(s0)=X¤g + (1 ¡ s
0) ¢ 1fxb¤(s0)=X¤)g = s
0:
These expressions imply that the requirements in (9) are met for x = L and x = X¤. For x =
0, however, the requirements lead to the indeterminacy (0/0). In this case, we assume that
the o®-equilibrium choice is uninformative about a person's type so that ª¤
3(x = 0;s0) = s0.
¤
Proposition 3 allows us to fully characterize the period-3 equilibrium value function for each









¼gu(e ¡ ¼g ¢ X¤ + X¤ ¡ L) + (1 ¡ ¼g)u(e ¡ ¼g ¢ X) if s0 < ¾¤








u(e ¡ ¼b ¢ L) if s0 < ¾¤
u(e ¡ [¼b ¡ s0(¼b ¡ ¼g)] ¢ L) if s0 ¸ ¾¤
Furthermore, V
g¤
3 (s0) is continuous in s0 and concave over [¾¤;1], V b¤
3 (s0) < V
g¤
3 (s0) for s0 < ¾¤,
and V b¤
3 (s) = V
g¤
3 (s) for s0 ¸ ¾¤.
Proof ¾¤ solves the equation x(¾¤) = X¤. By de¯nition x(¾¤) is such that ¼gu(e¡¼g¢x(¾¤)+
x(¾¤)¡L)+(1¡¼g)u(e¡¼g ¢x(¾¤)) = u(e¡[¼b¡¾¤(¼b¡¼g)]¢L). Therefore it follows that
V
g¤
3 (s0) = V
g¤
3 (¾¤) for all s0 · ¾¤. Since V
g¤
3 (s0) is clearly continuous over [¾¤;1], continuity
of V
g¤
3 (s0) follows. Concavity of V
g¤
3 (s0) over [¾¤;1] can be established by di®erentiating with
respect to s0 twice. Finally, observe that u(e¡¼b¢L) < u(e¡[¼b¡¾¤(¼b¡¼g)]¢L). Therefore
V b¤
3 (s0) < V
g¤
3 (s0) for all s0 < ¾¤.
¤
Figure 1 illustrates the properties of V i¤
3 functions. For s0 < ¾¤, the value functions are
constant for both types but it is constant at a lower level for type b than for type g. For
s0 ¸ ¾¤, the value functions for both types coincide and is strictly increasing in the score. The
existence of the increasing segment in these value functions is the reason why it is desirable
for people to emerge from the credit market with a high type score.
266 Credit Market Equilibrium: Debt, Default, and Sig-
nalling
We are interested in the possibility of equilibria in which people resist opportunistic behavior
in the credit market with a view to obtaining better terms in the insurance market. The
fact that V i¤
3 (s0) is strictly increasing in s0 for s0 > ¾¤ provides people with the incentive to
signal that they are more likely to be of type g. However it is an interesting (if somewhat
inconvenient) fact that from the perspective of period 3 it is the type b people who lose
more from default than type g people. To see this consider Figure 1. Suppose that in
equilibrium repayment of debt leads to a type score s0 = sR and default leads to a type score
s0 = sD < sR. By Proposition 4 (or simply from inspection of Figure 1) it is evident that the








cannot be any greater than the loss from
default for type b
£
V b¤
3 (sR) ¡ V b¤
3 (sD)
¤
and can, in fact, be strictly less. On this count we
would expect type b to have less of an incentive to default than type g. However, as noted
earlier, it is possible to make assumptions on either discount factors or the distribution of
preference shocks that ensure that default is less likely for type g than type b.
In what follows we seek conditions under which the following three basic properties hold in
equilibrium.
² P1: ª¤
1(`) > 0 is strictly increasing in `, with ª¤(`min) < ° < ª¤(`max). That is,
borrowing less or saving more improves the likelihood that a person is of type g and
this likelihood is less than ° for the largest loan and greater than ° for the largest
deposit.





1(`)) for ` < 0. That is, repaying a loan
improves the likelihood that a person is of type g while default worsens it.
² P3: ª¤
2(0;`;ª¤
1(`)) > 0 is non-decreasing in `. This assumption rules out the possi-
bility that a person who borrowed more can end period 2 with a better score (upon
27repayment) than a person who borrowed less (and repaid) or who saved.




1(`) for ` > 0. That is, for people without debt there is no
change in their score in period 2. This assumption simply recognizes that since these
people do not make any choices in period 2, nothing further is revealed about them.
Our strategy is to assume that there are functions ª¤
t that satisfy properties P1-P4 (and some
additional properties speci¯c to each of the following subsections) and then show that there
exist distribution functions that make ª¤
t consistent with the equilibrium requirements on
belief-updating functions. In the ¯rst approach we require that F
g
t (µ) = F b
t (µ) (no di®erence
in distribution of preference shocks across types) and in the second approach we require that
¯b = ¯g (no di®erence in discount factors across types).
We begin by establishing a simple property of every competitive equilibrium, namely, that
the default decision has a threshold property with respect to µ2.
Lemma 3 Let ` < 0. There exists µi¤
2 ¸ 0 such that di¤(µ2;`;ª¤
1(`)) = 1 for µ2 > µi¤
2 and 0
otherwise.
Proof: For ` < 0, the bene¯t from default is µ0




1(`))) ¡ V i
3(ª¤
2(1;`;ª¤
1(`)))]. The bene¯t of default is strictly positive. By
Proposition 4 and P2, the cost of default is non-negative. If the cost is 0 then the bene¯t of
default exceeds the cost for all µ2 > 0 and is equal to the cost for µ2 = 0. Therefore µi¤
2 = 0.
If the cost is strictly positive it is bounded above by ¯i [V i¤
3 (1) ¡ V i¤
3 (0)]. Therefore, there
must exist µ0




Next we point out that equilibrium loan prices are zero if there is no private information
about types or if both types have the same probability of loss in period 3. Thus in our
28environment, the desire to signal private information about type is the fundamental reason
why active trade can occur in the credit market.
Corollary to Lemma 3: If type is observable or if ¼g = ¼b, then q¤(`;ª¤
1(`)) = 0, provided
the probability of µ2 = 0 is 0.
Proof: If type is observable, then competition implies that full insurance is available to
type g and b at prices ¼g and ¼b, respectively. Since both types are risk averse it is optimal
for them to buy full insurance. Then, in period 2, it is strictly optimal for both types to
default for any µ2 > 0 since defaulting yields utility µ2u(e)+¯iu(e¡¼iL) and not defaulting
yields utility µ2u(e+`)+¯iu(e¡¼iL), where ` < 0. If the probability of µ2 = 0 is zero, both
types will default with certainty, i.e., ¹¤(`) = 1. Then q¤(`;ª¤(`)) must be 0.
If ¼g = ¼b = ¼ then insurers do not care about a person's type and, under competition, both
types will be o®ered full insurance at the price ¼. Once again, it is strictly optimal for both
types to default on any ` < 0 for any µ2 > 0.
¤
6.1 Credit Market Equilibrium with Di®erences in Discount Fac-
tors
In this subsection we will assume that type g is more patient than type b but the distribution
functions for the two types are the same. That is, ¯b < ¯g and F b
t (µ) = F
g
t (µ). Furthermore,
we take A = f¡a;0g. That is, people in period 1 have the option of choosing to borrow a or
not. This is a strong assumption. At the end of this section we discuss what happens when
more asset choices are permitted.
We make the following assumption on discount factors.
Assumption 2: ¯b £
V b¤





3 (1) ¡ V
g¤
3 (0)].
29The assumption requires that even if the period-3 cost of default for type b exceeds the
period-3 cost of default for type g by as much as is possible, the discounted cost of default
is less for type b than type g. With this assumption we have the following useful result.
Lemma 4: Given Assumption 2, there exists ~ ¾ 2 (¾¤;1) such that ¯g [V
g¤





3 (s0) ¡ V b¤
3 (0)
¤
if and only if s0 2 (~ ¾;1],
Proof: Consider the function w(s0) = ¯g [V
g¤








for s0 2 [¾¤;1]. Since V i¤
3 (1) = u(e ¡ ¼gL), it follows from Assumption 2 that w(1) > 0. By
Proposition 4, V
g¤
3 (s0) = V b¤
3 (s0) for all s0 2 [¾¤;1] so that w(s0) is continuous and strictly
increasing in s0 for s0 2 [¾¤;1]. Furthermore by Proposition 4, V
g¤
3 (¾¤) = V
¤g
3 (0) > V b¤
3 (0).
Hence w(¾¤) < 0. Therefore, there must exist ~ ¾ 2 (¾¤;1) such that w(~ ¾) = 0. The
Proposition follows.
¤
In what follows we assume that we have given ª¤
t functions satisfying P1-P4. In addition,




1(`)) > ~ ¾ for ` = ¡a.
This assumption requires that repaying the debt a puts a person's score in the ~ ¾ to 1 range.
This assumption will ensure that type b people have a greater incentive to default than type
g people in period 2.
Proposition 5 Given Assumptions 2 and 3, the optimal default thresholds µi¤
2 are (i) strictly




Proof: By Lemma 3 there exist µi¤
2 ¸ 0 such that di¤(µ2;¡a;ª¤
1(¡a)) = 1 for µ2 > µi¤
2
and zero otherwise. (i) To establish that the default thresholds µi¤
2 are strictly positive,
consider a type i with debt a. The bene¯t from default is given by µ2[u(e) ¡ u(e ¡ a)]







Assumption 3 and Lemma 4 we know that ª¤
2(0;¡a;ª¤





1(¡a)). By Proposition 4 it follows that the cost of default
is strictly positive for both types. Since the bene¯t of default is clearly positive, the default
thresholds given by µi¤








(ii) To establish that µb¤
2 < µ
g¤
2 we need to consider two cases. First, consider the case where
ª¤
2(1;¡a;ª¤
1(¡a)) is also at least as large as ¾¤. Then it follows from Proposition 4 that the
undiscounted cost of default [V i¤
3 (ª¤
2(0;¡a;ª¤
1(¡a))) ¡ V i¤
3 (ª¤
2(1;¡a;ª¤
1(¡a)))] is the same
for both types. But ¯b < ¯g so the discounted cost of default is strictly lower for type b
compared to type g. Therefore µb¤
2 < µ
g¤
2 . Second, consider the case where ª¤
2(1;¡a;ª¤
1(¡a))
is strictly less than ¾¤. Then by Proposition 4 the discounted cost of default for type i is




3 (0)]. By Assumption 3 and Lemma 4, the discounted






The following proposition establishes that there exists a distribution of preference shocks
that will make the default thresholds obtained in the previous Proposition consistent with
the belief-updating functions. The belief-updating function implicitly ¯xes the probability
of repayment (and therefore of default) of the two types and property P2 implies that the
probability of repayment by type g is greater than the probability of repayment by type
b. Since the default threshold for type g is higher than the default threshold for type b
as established in the previous Proposition, the ordering of repayment probabilities and the
ordering of default thresholds coincide. Hence a distribution function can be found for which
the probability mass below the default thresholds of type b and type g equals the repayment
probabilities implied by the belief-updating functions.
Proposition 6: For ª¤
2(d;`;ª¤
1(`)) satisfying Assumption 3 there exist distribution functions
F2(µ) (same for both types) for which ª¤
2(d;`;ª¤
1(`)) constitutes a period-2 equilibrium and
for which both types default or repay with strictly positive probability.
31Proof: Recall that a period-2 equilibrium is a pair of decision rules di¤(µ2;`;ª¤
1(`)), i 2
fb;gg, and a belief-updating function ª¤
2(d;`;ª¤
1(`)) such that the decision rules are optimal
given the belief updating function and the belief-updating function satis¯es Bayes' Law
(wherever applicable) given the optimal decision rules.
Consider the decision rules di¤(µ2;¡a;ª¤
1(¡a)) = 1 for µ2 > µi¤
2 and di¤(µ2;¡a;ª¤
1(¡a)) = 0
for µ2 · µi¤
2 . By Proposition 5 these decision rules are optimal given the belief-updating
function ª¤
2(d;`;ª1(`)).
We will now establish that there exists a probability distribution function F2(µ) for which
ª¤
2(d;`;ª1(`)) satis¯es Bayes' Law wherever applicable given these decision rules. Let ¢i¤
2





























2 ) ¢ ª¤
1(¡a)) + (1 ¡ ¢b¤





1(¡a)), d 2 f0;1g, these two equations pin down the values of ¢i¤
2 , i 2
fb;gg. To see this assume (this will be veri¯ed to be true) that ¢
¤g





2 , where ½¤
2 is the repayment likelihood ratio. Since ª¤













Viewed as a function of ½¤




1(¡a)) determines a unique strictly positive value of ½¤
2. Furthermore, the r.h.s
of (16) is equal to ª¤
1(¡a) for ½¤
2 = 1. Therefore it follows from the last inequality in P2 that
½¤
2 < 1, namely, the probability that type b repays is less than the probability that type g
32repays. Similarly, letting ±¤
2 = (1 ¡ ¢
g¤
2 )=(1 ¡ ¢
g¤
2 ), where ±¤
2 is the default likelihood ratio,












The r.h.s of (17) is strictly decreasing in ±¤
2 and, given ª¤
2(1;¡a;ª¤
1), determines a unique
strictly positive value of ±¤
2. And by the second inequality in P2, it follows that ±¤
2 >
1, i.e., the probability of a type b person defaulting is greater than the probability of a
type g person defaulting. Now note that from the de¯nitions of ½¤
2 and ±¤
2 we have that
¢
¤g
2 = [1 ¡ ±¤
2]=[½¤
2 ¡ ±¤
2]. Since 0 < ½¤
2 < 1 < ±¤
2 it follows that ¢
g¤





2 is also in (0;1). Now consider any distribution function for which F2(µ
g¤




2 ) = ¢b¤






2 such a distribution can always be
found. Denote the distribution function by F ¤
2(µ). Given the optimal decision rules and
the distribution function F ¤
2(µ), the belief-updating function will, by construction, satisfy
Bayes' Law. Therefore there exists a distribution F ¤




We turn now to period 1.
Lemma 5: Given ª¤
1(`) and the default thresholds µi¤
2 the period-1 equilibrium price function
q¤(¡a;ª¤
1(¡a)) > 0.






By Proposition 6 and P1 the probability of repayment is strictly positive. By the zero pro¯t
condition it follows that q¤(¡a;ª¤
1(¡a)) is also strictly positive.
¤
The next proposition establishes that the period-1 decision rules also display a threshold
property and the thresholds for the two types can be ordered.
33Proposition 7 (i) For i 2 fb;gg, there exists µi¤
1 > 0 such that `i¤(µ1) = 0 for µ1 · µi¤
1 and
`i¤(µ1) = ¡a for µ1 > µi¤




Proof: (i) The \gain" from borrowing a is µ1[u(e + q¤(¡a;ª¤
1(¡a)) ¢ a) ¡ u(e)] and the
\cost" is ¯iEµ2 [V i¤
2 (µ2;0;ª¤
1(0)) ¡ V i¤
2 (µ2;¡a;ª¤
1(¡a))]. By Lemma 5 the \gain" is indeed
positive. We will now establish that the \cost" is positive as well. Consider ¯rst the set of
µ2 · µi¤
2 . For these µ2 the (discounted) cost is given by
¯




















Therefore by Proposition 4 the second term is non-negative. Next consider the µ2 > µi¤
2 . For
















by properties P2-P3 and Proposition 4. Since the cost is positive for all realizations of µ2,
¯iEµ2 [V i¤
2 (µ2;0;ª¤
1(0)) ¡ V i¤
2 (µ2;¡a;ª¤
1(¡a))] is positive. Then for each type there exists
µi¤
1 > 0 such that `i¤(µ1) = 0 for µ1 · µi¤
1 and `i¤(µ1) = ¡a for µ1 > µi¤
1 .
(ii) To establish that µb¤
1 < µ
g¤
1 we need to show that the cost of default is strictly lower
for type b than for type g. From the expressions given above, it is evident that for any µ2
the cost of default converges to 0 as ¯i converges to 0. Therefore there must exist some















1(¡a))]. Given this it follows that if a type g person
is indi®erent between borrowing and not borrowing for µ1 = µ
g¤
1 , then type b must strictly
prefer to borrow at µ1 = µ
g¤





We turn now to establishing that there exist distribution functions F1(µ) that can support
34given belief-updating functions ª¤
1 and ª¤
2 satisfying P1-P4 as an equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 8 There exists a distribution function F1(µ) for which ª¤
1(`) constitutes a
period-1 equilibrium. Furthermore, for this distribution function both types choose 0 and
¡a with positive probability.
Proof: Recall that a period-1 equilibrium is a pair of decision rules `i¤(µ1), a belief-updating
function ª¤
1(`), and a pricing function q¤(`;ª¤
1(`)) such that the decision rules are optimal
given the belief-updating function, the pricing function, and the period-2 equilibrium value
functions. And the pricing function satis¯es zero pro¯ts and the belief-updating function
satis¯es Bayes' Law (wherever applicable) given the optimal decision rules.
The decision rules `i¤(µ1) were derived for the given ª¤
1(`) function, the equilibrium period-2
value functions, and pricing function satisfying zero pro¯ts. Therefore, all we need to show
is that there exists a distribution function F1(µ) for which ª¤
1(`) satis¯es Bayes' Rule. The
proof closely follows the logic of the proof of Proposition 6 and therefore will be sketched.
Denote the probability that type i chooses ` = 0 with ¢i¤
1 . Then the probability that type
i chooses ` = ¡a is (1 ¡ ¢i¤
1 ). Assume (and this will be veri¯ed to be true) that ¢
g¤
1 is in









1 ¢ ° + ¢b¤






1 ) ¢ °
(1 ¡ ¢
g¤
1 ) ¢ ° + (1 ¡ ¢b¤
1 ) ¢ (1 ¡ °)
:
Given ª¤
1(`), these two equations determine the values of ¢b¤
1 and ¢
g¤
1 . It can be shown
that P1 implies (i) ¢i¤
1 2 (0;1) and (ii) ¢b¤
1 < ¢
g¤
1 (the proof parallels the one given in
Proposition 6 for ¢i¤
2 and is omitted).
Now consider any distribution function for which F1(µ
g¤
1 ) = ¢
g¤
1 and F1(µb¤





1 (by Proposition 7) and ¢b¤
1 < ¢
g¤
1 such a distribution always exists. Denote
the distribution function by F ¤
1(µ). Given the optimal decision rules and the distribution
function F ¤
1(µ), the belief-updating function ª¤
1(`) will, by construction, satisfy Bayes' Law.
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What have we learned? It is possible to construct equilibria in which what we have called
the type score behaves like a credit score. In the constructed equilibrium (i) a person's type
score declines as the person borrows more (as in P1), (ii) default on debt lowers a person's
type score (as in P2), and (iii) people with low type scores get worse insurance rates and
are, on average, more likely to ¯le a claim (su®er the loss L). However, our type score goes
beyond a credit score in that it takes into account a person's asset information (as in P1
and P4), which real-world credit scores do not take into account but which credit granters
might.12
The construction relied on the assumption that people di®er with respect to their discount
factors and those who are less patient are also more likely to su®er the loss. Although not
modeled, the idea underlying the link between patience and loss probability is that the loss
probability can be reduced if a person undertakes some costly investment. Since less patient
people are less likely to invest, there is likely to be a positive association between the degree
of impatience and loss probability.
The construction leaned rather heavily on the fact that there was a single level of debt that
people could choose. Can the results be generalized to many asset/loan levels? There is a
close connection between properties P1 and P2 and the monotone comparative statics results
of Milgrom and Shannon [10] and Athey [1]. These authors study conditions under which
a decisionmaker's optimal choice (say, to default or not) is increasing in some parameter
(say, ¯). They show that there is a monotonic relationship between the optimal choice and
the parameter, provided the di®erence in payo® from choosing one action over the other is
increasing in the parameter (the so-called property of increasing di®erence). The proofs of
Propositions 5 and 7 relied on the property of increasing di®erence. In Proposition 5 we
established that the (expected) bene¯t from choosing repayment over default was increasing
12To see what kinds of information credit scores are based on and what kinds of information o®ers of credit
are based on, see http://www.myfico.com/Downloads/Files/myFICO UYFS Booklet.pdf
36in ¯. Similarly in Proposition 7 we established that the expected gain from choosing ` = 0
over choosing ` = ¡a was also increasing in ¯. These results were instrumental in establishing
the ordering of default and debt thresholds that allowed us to establish the existence of
distribution functions that support belief-updating functions with the desired properties.
Generalizing the results of this section to many asset choices requires that we generalize
the increasing di®erence property to the many-asset case. This appears to be a challenging
exercise.13 However, the second approach to modeling di®erences between people obviates
the need to rely on the property of increasing di®erences and can handle multiple asset
choices with less di±culty. We turn to this alternative approach next.
6.2 Credit Market Equilibrium with Di®erences in the Distribu-
tion of Preference Shocks
In this subsection we assume that discount factors are the same for both types but permit
the distribution of preference shocks to be di®erent across types. We will assume that A is
a ¯nite set with potentially many elements. It will be convenient to label the elements of
A by `k, k = 1;2;:::;K, where `k+1 < `k. We will assume that A has both negative and
positive elements with `J = 0, 1 < J < K. Hence `k ¸ 0 for k · J and `k < 0 for k > J.




that satisfy properties P1-P4. However, in this section we will ¯nd it necessary to restrict
these functions further. The following two assumptions ensure that the cost of default is
strictly positive for both types.
Assumption 4: For all `k, ª¤
2(0;`k;ª¤
1(`k)) > ¾¤. This assumption requires that repay-
ment on debt lead to a score greater than ¾¤. Note that by property P4, it also requires that
saving lead to a score greater than ¾¤.
13Multiple asset choices can be handled if the asset levels are chosen with care, but for arbitrary choice of
asset levels, however, the increasing di®erence property need not hold.
37Assumption 5: For `k < 0, ª¤
2(1;`k;ª¤
1(`k)) < ¾¤. This assumption requires that default
lead to a score less than ¾¤.
By Lemma 3 we know that period-2 default decision rules satisfy the threshold property.
What we show next is that, for each type, the default thresholds are strictly positive and
that lower the thresholds, the higher the debt. This result has no analog in the previous
subsection, since there was only one debt level.
Proposition 9 Given Assumptions 4 and 5, there exist unique and strictly positive default
thresholds µi¤
2;k for each i and `k < 0. Furthermore, µi¤
2;k+1 < µi¤
2;k.
Proof: The bene¯t from default is given by µ2[u(e) ¡ u(e + `k)] > 0: The cost of default
is given by ¯[V i¤
3 (ª¤
2(0;`k;ª¤
1(`k))) ¡ V i¤
3 (ª¤
2(1;`k;ª¤
1(`k)))]: By Assumption 5 and Propo-
sition 4, we can write the cost as ¯[V i¤
3 (ª¤
2(0;`k;ª¤
1(`k))) ¡ V i¤
3 (0)]: By Assumption 4 and
Proposition 4 V i¤
3 (ª¤
2(0;`k;ª¤
1(`k))) > V i¤
3 (0). Therefore, the cost of default is strictly pos-
itive for both types. Hence there must exist µi¤
2;k > 0 such that µi¤





3 (0)]. To prove that the thresholds are increasing in `k, observe
that by P3 and Proposition 4 V i¤
3 (ª¤
2(0;`k;ª¤
1(`k))) is nondecreasing in `k. Hence the cost
of default is non-decreasing in `k. Since the bene¯t of default is strictly decreasing in `k it
follows that default thresholds µi¤
2;k are strictly increasing in `k, or equivalently, µi¤
2;k+1 < µi¤
2;k
(recall that higher k means more debt).
¤
We now turn to establishing that there exist distribution functions F i
2(µ) that can support
the given belief-updating function ª¤
2(d;`;ª¤
1(`)) in a period-2 equilibrium. To establish this
we need to restrict the belief-updating function further. Consider debt `k < 0 and let ¢¤i
2;k










default likelihood ratio on debt `k. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 6: For k = J +1;:::;K, (i) ¢
¤g
2;k is in (0;1), (ii) ½¤
2;k is strictly decreasing in
38k and (iii) ¢
g¤
2;k is also strictly decreasing in k.
We know from the arguments given in the proof of Proposition 6 that the probabilities
of repayment and default by type i are ¯xed by ª¤
2(d;`k;ª¤
1(`k)), d 2 f0;1g and that P2
implies that ½¤
2;k < 1 < ±¤
2;k. Before we can proceed we need to verify that Assumption 6
does not con°ict with Assumptions 4 and 5 and properties P1-P4. To recap the dependence
between likelihood ratios and the probability of repayment note that the de¯nitions of these













1(`k)) = 1=[1 + ±¤
2;k ¢ [(1 ¡ ª¤
1(`k))=ª¤
1(`k)]]. Hence the
likelihood ratios are ¯xed by the period-2 belief-updating function. Turning to Assumption
6(i) the requirement that ¢
¤g






1) which implies that ½¤
2;k < 1 < ±¤
2;k). Turning to




be non-decreasing in `k, or equivalently, non-increasing in k. But by property P1, the term
[(1 ¡ ª¤
1(`k))=ª¤
1(`k)] is decreasing in `k, or equivalently, increasing in k. Therefore, it is
possible for ½¤
2;k to be strictly decreasing in k without violating P3. Finally, by choosing the
sequence ±¤






2;k] is decreasing in k. It is worth noting that the variation in
±¤
2;k can freely be chosen because Assumption 5 (which restricts ±¤
2;k) requires only that
1=[1 + ±¤
2;k ¢ [(1 ¡ ª¤
1(`k))=ª¤
1(`k)]] be less than ¾¤.14
We can now state the following result.
Proposition 10: Given Assumptions 4-6, there exist distribution functions F i
2(µ2) for which
the belief-updating functions ª¤
2(d;`k;ª¤
1(`k)) constitute a period-2 equilibrium.
Proof: The fact that the thresholds µi¤
2;k are optimal given the belief-updating function
ª¤
2(d;`k;ª¤
1(`k)) follows from Proposition 9. Let F
g¤







for k = J + 1;:::;K: Since ¢
g¤
2;k is declining in k by Assumption 6 and µ
g¤
2;k is declining
14This degree of freedom comes from the fact that if 1=[1+±¤
2k ¢[(1¡ª¤
1(`k))=ª¤
1(`k)]] is less than ¾¤ then
by Proposition 4 V i¤
3 (s0) is constant for any s0 < ¾¤. Thus the precise value of ±¤
2;k is not important for
determining the payo® from default.
39in k by Proposition 9 such a distribution exists. Let F b¤






2;k. Observe that since ½¤
2;k and ¢
¤g




(0;1). Since the product is declining by Assumption 6 and µb¤
2;k is declining by Proposition 9,
such a distribution also exists. Given the optimal decision rules and the distribution function
F i¤
2 (µ), the belief-updating function ª¤
2(d;`k;ª¤
1(`)) will, by construction, satisfy Bayes' Law.
Therefore there exist distribution functions F i¤
2 (µ2) that deliver a belief-updating function
ª¤
2 consistent with Assumptions 4, 5 and 6.
¤
In the previous subsection we provided an explanation of why a person's type score might
decline with default that was based on di®erences in discount factors between the low-risk
and the high-risk types. These di®erences implied that the default threshold for type b (the
high-risk type from the insurer's perspective) was lower than the default threshold for type
g. Since the two types faced the same distribution of preference shocks, the ordering of
default thresholds implied that default should lower the likelihood that the person is type
g. In contrast, Proposition 10 provides a very di®erent explanation of why default leads
to a decline in the score. The di®erence can be encapsulated in the following corollary to
Proposition 9.
Corollary to Proposition 9: For `k < 0, the default threshold µ
g¤
2;k is strictly less than
the default threshold µb¤
2;k.
Proof: The cost of default for type i is given by ¯[V i¤
3 (ª¤
2(0;`k;ª¤
1)) ¡ V i¤
3 (0)]. By
Proposition 4, V b¤
3 (0) < V
g¤
3 (0). Therefore, the cost of default is larger for type b than for






From the perspective of decision rules, type b people have less of a predilection toward default
40than type g people, which is exactly opposite to what was true in the case of di®erences in
discount factors. Nevertheless, default leads to a lower type score because type b people are
more likely to get high preference shocks. Indeed, combining the corollary with Assumption 6















2;k) for all µi¤
2;k { which is consistent with F b¤
2 (µ2)
¯rst-order stochastic dominating F
g¤
2 (µ2), i.e., with type b distribution putting relatively
more probability mass on high values of µ and the type g distribution putting relatively
more probability mass on low values of µ.
We turn now to period 1 and to establishing that the period-1 belief-updating function ª¤
1(`)
can also be supported as an equilibrium for some pair of distribution functions F i
1(µ). To do







2(µ2) is strictly increasing in `k or, equivalently, strictly
decreasing in k.
Proof: Let `k0 > `k. We will consider 3 mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases.
Case 1: `k0 > `k ¸ 0. Then V i¤
2 (µ2;`k0;ª¤





k > 0 we have ª¤
2(0;`k;ª¤
1(`k)) = ª¤
1(`k). Therefore V i¤
2 (µ2;`k0;ª¤
1(`k0)) = µ2u(e +
`k0) + ¯V i¤
3 (ª¤
1(`k0)): Similarly, V i¤
2 (µ2;`k;ª¤
1(`k)) = µ2u(e + `k) + ¯V i¤
3 (ª¤
1(`k)). By P1 and
Assumption 4, ª¤
1(`k0) > ª¤
1(`k) > ¾¤. Then by Proposition 4 V i¤
3 (ª¤
1(`k0)) > V i¤
3 (ª¤
1(`k)).
Since `k0 > `k, V i¤
2 (µ2;`k0;ª¤
1(`k0)) > V i¤
2 (µ2;`k;ª¤
1(`k)) for each µ2. The result then follows.
Case 2: Let `k0 ¸ 0 > `k. Within this case, consider ¯rst µ2 · µi¤
2;k. By Proposition 9. these
are µ2 values for which there is repayment of the debt `k. Hence V i¤
2 (µ2;`k;ª¤
1(`k)) = µ2u(e+
`k) + ¯V i¤
3 (ª2(0;`k;ª¤
1)). The expression for V i¤
2 (µ2;`k0;ª¤
1(`k0)) is exactly the same as in









1(`k)) > ¾¤. By Proposition 4 V i¤
2 (µ2;`k0;ª¤
1(`k0)) > V i¤
2 (µ2;`k;ª¤
1(`k)). Next
consider µ2 > µi¤
2;k. For these µ2 there is default on the debt `k. Therefore V i¤
2 (µ2;`k;ª¤
1(`k)) =
µ2u(e) + ¯V i¤
3 (ª2(1;`k;ª¤
1). The expression for V i¤
2 (µ2;`k0;ª¤
1(`k0)) is exactly the same as in
41case (1) again. By P2, Assumption 5 and Proposition 4 V i¤
3 (ª¤




Since `k0 > 0, V i¤
2 (µ2;`k0;ª¤
1(`k0)) > V i¤
2 (µ2;`k;ª¤
1(`k)) for each µ2. The result follows.
Case 3: Finally consider the case where 0 > `k0 > `k. Within this case there are 3 subcases
to consider. Consider ¯rst µ2 < µi¤
2;k. By Proposition 9, this is the set of µ2 for which there
is no default on `k0 or `k. Thus V i¤
2 (µ2;`k0;ª¤






1(`k)) = µ2u(e + `k) + ¯V i¤
3 (ª¤
2(0;`k;ª¤




1(`k)) > ¾¤ it follows by Proposition 4
that V i¤
2 (µ2;`k0;ª¤
1(`k0)) > V i¤
2 (µ2;`k;ª¤
1(`k)) Next consider µ2 2 [µi¤
2;k;µi¤
2;k0]. For these values
there is repayment on `0
k but default on `k. Therefore V i¤
2 (µ2;`k0;ª¤
1(`k0))) = µ2u(e + `k0) +
¯V i¤
3 (ª(0;`k0;ª¤
1(`k0))) and V i¤
2 (µ2;`k;ª¤




fault is an option on `k0, µ2u(e+`k0)+¯V i¤
3 (ª¤
2(0;`k0;ª¤




By Assumption 5 and Proposition 4, µ2u(e) + ¯V i¤
3 (ª¤
2(1;`k0;ª¤




1(`k))). Therefore V i¤
2 (µ2;`k0;ª¤




2;k0. For these µ2 there is default on both `k0 and `k. Consequently, by the argument in
the preceding case, the utility obtained is the same for `k0 and `k. Since the utility obtained
for `k0 is strictly larger than utility obtained for `k for µ2 < µ¤i
2;k0 and at least as large for all










We can now prove that in period 1 the decision rules `i¤
k (µ1) are decreasing in µ1, but need
the following preliminary Lemma.
Lemma 7: Given Assumption 6 and the period-1 belief-updating function ª¤
1(`k), the
period-1 equilibrium pricing function q¤(`k;ª¤
1(`k)) is strictly positive for all `k.
Proof: Consider `k < 0. By Assumption 6, the repayment probability on the debt `k,
¢i¤
2;k, is in (0;1) and by P1 ª¤
1(`k) > 0. Therefore the equilibrium probability of repayment
1 ¡ ¹¤(`k) = ª¤
1(`k)¢
g¤
2;k + [1 ¡ ª¤
1(`k)]¢b¤
2;k is in (0;1). By the zero pro¯t condition on the
pricing of loans it follows that q(`k;ª¤
1) = [1 ¡ ¹¤(`k)]=(1 + r) > 0. Next, consider `k > 0.
42By the zero pro¯t condition on pricing of loans q¤(`;ª¤
1(`k)) = 1=(1 + r) > 0.
¤
Proposition 11: ^ µ1 > ~ µ1 implies `i¤(^ µ1) · `i¤(~ µ1).
Proof: Pick a shock ~ µ1 and let ~ ` = `i¤(~ µ1). Consider ¹ ` > ~ `. Then we claim that
q¤(~ `;ª¤
1(~ `)) ¢ ~ ` < q¤(¹ `;ª¤
1(¹ `)) ¢ ¹ `. If not, the person can select ¹ ` and guarantee at least






2(µ2) is strictly increasing in `. This would contradict the optimal-
ity of ~ `. Next, by optimality, ~ µ1
h
u(e ¡ q¤(~ `;ª¤
1(~ `)) ¢ ~ `) ¡ u(e ¡ q¤(¹ `;ª¤
1(¹ `)) ¢ ¹ `)
i
is at least
as large as ¯Eµ2
h
V i¤
2 (µ2; ¹ `;ª¤
1(¹ `)) ¡ V i¤
2 (µ2; ~ `;ª¤
1(~ `))
i
. But q¤(~ `;ª¤
1(~ `)) ¢ ~ ` < q¤(¹ `;ª¤
1(¹ `)) ¢ ¹ `
implies that ~ µ1
h
u(e ¡ q¤(~ `;ª¤
1(~ `)) ¢ ~ `) ¡ u(e ¡ q¤(¹ `;ª¤
1(¹ `)) ¢ ¹ `)
i
> 0. Therefore for ^ µ1 >
~ µ1, ^ µ1
h
u(e ¡ q¤(~ `;ª¤
1(~ `) ¢ ~ `)) ¡ u(e ¡ q¤(¹ `;ª¤
1(¹ `) ¢ ¹ `))
i
is greater than ¯Eµ2[V2(µ2; ¹ `;ª¤
1(¹ `)) ¡
V2(µ2; ~ `;ª¤
1(~ `))]. Since ¹ ` was arbitrary, it follows that `i¤(^ µ1) · ~ ` = `i¤(~ µ1).
¤
We are now in a position to establish that there exist period-1 distribution functions that
support the given period-1 belief-updating function. For ease of exposition, however, we will
assume that for the (given) equilibrium q¤(`k;ª¤
1(`k)) every element of A is chosen by each
type for some µ1. We do this because if there are actions that are not chosen by any type,
then those actions do not have to satisfy a Bayes' Rule restriction. But it is important that
if a particular loan level ^ `k 2 A is chosen by a type b person then ^ `k must also be chosen by
a type g person for some µ1.
Proposition 12: Let `i¤(µ1) be such that for each k and i, `i¤(µ1) = `k for some µ1.
Then there exist distribution functions F i
1(µ1) for which the belief-updating functions ª¤
1(`k)
constitute a period-1 equilibrium and for which each `k is chosen with positive probability.
Proof: By Proposition 11, `i¤(µ1) is decreasing in µ1. Since each element of A is chosen
for some µ1, it follows that each decision rule delivers a set of strictly increasing threshold
43values fµ¤i
1;kgK
k=1 such that `i¤(µ1) = `k i® µ1 2 [µ¤i
1;k;µ¤i
1;k+1), where µ¤i
1;1 = 0 and µ¤i
1;K+1 = 1.











1;k+1) ¡ F g(µ
g¤
1;k)] + (1 ¡ °)[F b(µb¤




1;k = F i(µi¤
1;k+1) ¡ F i(µi¤
1;k) and assume that ¢i¤

















1(`k) ¯xes a unique value ¸¤
1;k for each k. Since
ª¤
1(`k) is strictly decreasing in k by P1, ¸¤
1;k is strictly increasing in k. Then, satisfaction of
Bayes' Rule requires that there exist strictly positive probability weights f¢i¤
1;kg that satisfy












1;k = 1 for for all i (19)
















1;k will satisfy the Bayes' Rule requirements.
Observe that the condition ª¤
1(`1) > ° > ª¤
1(`K) in P1 is equivalent to the condition
¸¤
1;1 < 1 < ¸¤











1;K = 1. Let ¸1 =
PK¡1
k=2 ¸¤
1;k=(K ¡ 2) and let ² > 0. Now set (i)
¢
g¤
















1;K ¡ [(¸1 ¡ ¸¤
1;1)²=(¸¤
1;K ¡ ¸¤




1;k. For these settings one
can verify that both f¢
g¤
1;kg and f¢b¤
1;kg sum to 1. Therefore both (18) and (19) are satis¯ed.
¤
What have we learned? We showed that it is possible to construct equilibria with multiple
asset levels in which the type score again behaves like a credit score. We were able to do
so because there was no need to prove the analogs of Propositions 5(ii) and 7(ii) in this
44subsection. Instead the construction relied on di®erences in the probability distribution of
shocks to deliver the requisite properties of the belief-updating functions. For period 2, these
di®erences were consistent with the type g shock distribution being dominated by the type
b shock distribution in the ¯rst-order stochastic dominance sense.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we present a theory of unsecured consumer debt that does not rely on utility
costs of default or on enforcement mechanisms that arise in repeated-interaction settings.
The theory is based on private information about a person's type and on a person's incentive
to signal his type to entities other than creditors. Speci¯cally, debtors signal their low-risk
status to insurers by avoiding default in credit markets. The signal is credible because in
equilibrium people who repay are more likely to be the low-risk type and so receive better
insurance terms.
Our theory was motivated, in part, by facts regarding the role of credit scores in consumer
credit and auto insurance markets. Facts indicate that people with high scores receive credit
on cheaper terms, that scores decline with default, and that (given credit limits) greater
borrowing leads to lower scores. Also, drivers with high scores pay lower premiums for auto
insurance. In the theory presented in this paper, the likelihood that a person is the low-risk
type (what we labeled type score) displays these four properties of a credit score. In that
sense, we have provided a theory of credit scores as well.
Interestingly, we presented two rather di®erent mechanisms via which a credit score with
the four properties could arise. In the ¯rst mechanism, the low-risk types were also assumed
to be the more patient type. In this case, the low-risk people avoided default because they
cared more about the future insurance bene¯t of a higher score. In the second mechanism,
the low-risk people were equally as patient as the high-risk people but they were less likely
to su®er shocks that trigger default. Once again, repayment became a signal of low-risk
45status. Loosely speaking, the ¯rst mechanism relies on di®erences in behavior while the
second mechanism relies on di®erences in luck.
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